The scheme of this paper is to examine the relationship between politicians and civil servants, to see what are the strengths and weaknesses of our system, to examine whether we need systemic changes or whether corrections within the system will work. In order to do so the paper first attempts at looking at the constitutional and legal relationship between the different pillars of the State, the deviations and perversions which have crept into the system and the effect of such deviations, especially in the field of governance and measures necessary to apply suitable correctives so that administration comes back on the right track. The paper does address the problem in the higher echelons of government, but it is meant to deal with the whole gamut of government because very often politician-civil servant interface is at the field level and the general complaint is that field officers are under unbearable pressure and are prevented from doing their job. It is not as if this takes place at local levels only because increasingly Chief Ministers bypass the official hierarchy and speak directly to even fairly low ranking field officers.

The Indian Constitution is designed for separation of power between the legislature, the executive and judiciary, with well-defined areas or jurisdiction for each of these pillars of the State. There is an interface between the legislature and the executive at the level of the Council of Ministers, which is collectively responsible to the House, but the legislature cannot perform executive functions and the executive cannot tell the legislature how it will perform its duties. However, there is one major difference between our Constitution and that of, say, the United States. The Indian Constitution separates the executive itself into two parts. Under Articles 53 and 154 of the Constitution the executive power of the Union and the States vests in the President and the Governor respectively. This power is to be exercised by the President or Governor directly or through officers subordinate to him. These officers constitute the permanent civil service, or the permanent arm of the executive and are governed by Part XIV of the Constitution. Perhaps no other Constitution has an equivalent provision and this makes our Constitution singular if not unique.

The second component of the executive is the political. The President or Governor is required to act according to the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, appointed under Articles 74 and 163 of the Constitution. Because such advice is normally binding, such advice, for the officers, becomes an order which they must obey. Under Articles 77 and 166 respectively the President or Governor frames rules for the conduct of business of government. Work is allocated between Ministers as per the Business Allocation Rules and the manner in which the officers are required to help the President of Governor to exercise his executive functions is governed by the Rules of Business of the Executive Government. In a nutshell this means that though officers are subordinate to the President or Governor, they carry out orders of the Council of Ministers in accordance with the rules framed in this behalf. The Rules of Business of the Executive Government do provide for the Secretary to advise his Minister about the course of action proposed in a particular matter and to submit to him a note which could tell him about the propriety or legality of his orders and suggest that either such orders not be given or that they be suitably modified. The relationship between the Secretary and the Minister is organic. The Minister has the mandate of the people to govern, but the Secretary has an equivalent constitutional mandate to advise the Minister. Once his advice has been suitably considered, unless the Minister passes an illegal order, the Secretary is bound to implement it. The Minister, on his part, is required to support the Secretary who is implementing his order.
In the scheme of things in India, once a law is framed or rules and regulations are approved they apply to everyone, whether a member of the political executive or of the permanent civil service. A civil servant is required to implement the orders of government without bias, with honesty and without fear or favour. It is here that a degree of a difference of opinion begins to emerge between the political executive and the civil servants. Whatever the shape of the legislation, ministers and their cohorts expect that whereas their opponents will feel the heat of implementation, their supporters will be spared everything except that which personally benefits them. One can quote many examples. On issues of development ministers and other politicians would like the benefits to flow to areas from which they have obtained support, whereas the areas dominated by the opponents should be neglected. I clearly remember one former Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh telling me that a particular district should not be allotted funds because, as he put it, “It is a politically hopeless area”. No development programme of government can be designed to show bias and a civil servant cannot permit such bias to creep into the implementation of the programme. When he tries to be impartial he comes in clash with the politician.

Some years ago the Collector of Karimnagar in Andhra Pradesh undertook a campaign to restore alienated land to tribals as per the provisions of law. Naturally he stepped on a number of sensitive corns. He was advised by his MsLA to go slow, senior officers wanted him not to take the programme seriously, the Revenue Minister and the Chief Minister chided him for lack of tact and ultimately he was transferred. What was his fault? The legislature had enacted a law and he was carrying out the wishes of the legislature. Moreover, the public stance of government was that it would protect the tribals. However, as soon as individual interests began to be affected the will of the legislature disappears and the stance of the government changed. It is the Collector and the tribals who had to pay the price. Is this democracy? The point being made is that laws and rules apply to all and it is the duty of civil servants to ensure that this happens. The difference between the political executive and the permanent civil servant is that whereas the former can amend the laws and rules, the latter cannot. However, so long as the laws stand they apply to the political executive also and when it acts in violation of such laws it is guilty of wrongdoing. In a well-run democracy no politician dares to interfere with a civil servant doing his duty. In India such a civil servant is anathema.

There is another level at which there is confrontation. The Minister frames policy and the civil servants work according to it. For example, there is a transfer policy. However, postings and transfers are lucrative in the sense that people are quite willing to pay for a favourable posting. Ministers have no business to involve themselves in the postings and transfers of officials even of the lowest rank. Personnel management is the job of the head of department, who is expected to know the capability of his staff much better than a minister does. However, every politician in India would much rather involve himself in such activity rather than attend to policy. Let me give an example. In 1968 I was Deputy Secretary to the State Government in the Industries Department. The Fourth Five Year Plan was drawn up and submitted to the Minister for his approval. The file was returned to me with a note in the margin from the Minister’s Private Secretary stating that the Minister did not want to see the file. I personally took the file back to the Minister who told me that surely his PS had informed me that the Minister did not want to see it. When I explained to him that the file was of vital importance because it had the blue print of what the department would do in the next five years and the Minister must decide whether it met the commitments of his party and his own views on the direction that the State would take in industrialization, he bluntly told me that these were matters which did not interest him. I picked up the file, a sad man and started to leave the room. The Minister called me back and asked me whether I had posted a particular Inspector as desired by him. I was a young officer, but I lost my temper and told the Minister that he had rewritten the true relationship between a minister and a civil servant. I would frame the Five Year Plan and he would do the postings of inspector level officials.
The highly deleterious effect of such a dispensation is that government servants develop lateral links with politicians, thus upsetting the hierarchical order. This affects discipline, but more than that it makes civil servants look over their shoulder at their political mentors to see whether their actions would be approved. Therefore, they do not function according to the law but according to the whims of the party in power. The post Godhra riots could not have taken place in Ahmedabad if the Police Commissioner had done the duty enjoined on him by law rather than look for guidance from politicians. The recent incident at Ujjain in which a group of students, allegedly from the ruling party, assaulted a professor, which resulted in his death, would not have taken place if the police on duty had immediately intervened when the political wing of the students began to assume a threatening posture. Unfortunately, the police did nothing. When there is a Congress Government the officials, especially the police, take no action against supporters of the Congress and when there is a BJP Government they take no action against BJP front organizations. In West Bengal politicisation of the services has been almost institutionalised. How many professors will have to die before we make the politicians realise that they cannot interfere in matters prescribed by law and the police and district administration to realise that they are accountable to the law and not to the politicians?

Our politicians have trivialised their role to an unbelievable extent. For example, legislators are required to legislate, approve the budget, act as a watchdog in matters of expenditure by government, ask questions about the functioning of government and raise issues through debate. The legislators are required to call government to account and to ensure that it functions according to the will of the people. Legislators are not supposed to interfere in the day-to-day working of government and certainly are not expected to try and influence officials at all levels in order to obtain personal favours, harm opponents or improperly reward their own followers. It is most unfortunate that our legislators would like to perform all executive functions but not their own function of legislation and supervision of government. There can be no better example of this than the fact that in the past few years both the Union and the State budgets have been passed virtually without debate. It is by approving each individual demand before the Appropriation Act is enacted that the legislature calls government to account item-wise and department-wise before sanctioning any expenditure. When the vast majority of demands are guillotined how can the legislature keep a control over State income and expenditure?

The spirit of our Constitution and the mind-set of our legislators are clearly brought out by Articles 102 (1) (a) and 191 (1) (a). These Articles disqualify a person from membership of Parliament or of the State Legislature if he or she holds an office of profit under government. There is a qualification to the effect that Parliament or the State Legislature may exempt an office from being considered one of profit by appropriate legislation, but obviously that has to be an exception and not the rule. It is well known that members of the legislature, both at Federal and State levels, are offered lucrative sinecures which are offices of profit in order to retain their loyalty and ensure that the government does not lose its majority in the House. The exception could be, for example, in a period of emergency when a particular legislator is found to be the best person to head a key institution to deal with such emergency. However, because our legislators do want executive functions they have persuaded Parliament recently to enact a law which does wholesale removal of disqualification from about a tenth of the membership of Parliament. The important issue which arises out of this is that by doing so Parliament has virtually set aside the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and has instead extended the scope of political intervention in the work of the executive. Even our ministers have entered into the game. Under Articles 102 (1)-Explanation and 191 (1)-Explanation a Member of Parliament or the State Legislature will not be deemed to hold an office of profit which disqualifies him for membership of the House because he is a minister. In any case only a member of the House can be a minister and, therefore, this explanation is perfectly in order. However, what business have ministers to
also accept chairmanships of various State Undertakings? These are executive posts. A minister can certainly lay down policy on how State Undertakings of his department will function. He cannot head the corporation and if he does the disqualification pertaining to an office of profit should apply.

It was not always so. Till 1967 the politicians were those who had come through the crucible of the Independence Movement. They were strongly influenced by Gandhian austerity and probity and were imbued with a sense of patriotism and a desire to serve the people. Of course they often disagreed with the civil servants, but this was honest disagreement. We civil servants were heard and encouraged to give our opinions without fear or favour. If we were overruled it was with reason and we quite happily accepted the Minister’s orders. Let me give an example. Takhat Mal Jain, formerly Chief Minister of Madhya Bharat and Industries and Rural Development Minister in Madhya Pradesh, called the Industries Secretary and told him to examine a case pertaining to the Minister’s industrial friend. Wanting to curry favour the Secretary quickly wrote a note supporting the proposal. Takhat Malji told the Secretary, “I had asked the Secretary to Government to examine the case, not my courtier. Now examine the case on merits and give me your frank advice. If I want to favour my friend I shall do so over my signature, but you must record all the facts and the pros-and-cons of the case. How could one not admire such a Minister?

1967 was the watershed when defections were engineered through outright bribery and power was purchased as a commodity. Legislators suddenly found that they could command a price. In order to pay it the state had to be suborned and this could not happen if the civil service were honest, impartial and impervious to undue pressure. Such a service had to be broken. The weapon used was the power of transfer. Honest officers were shunted out of responsible positions and pliable ones replaced them. Indira Gandhi coined the phrase “committed officers”. So many officers succumbed to these tactics that the élan of the All India Service, especially the Indian Administrative Service, was broken and the State Services were reduced to grovelling. What is worse, the new generation of politicians the system bred had accession to power, however briefly, as the main objective and using the office for personal gain as the main motivation.

This led to many unfortunate results. Populism of the lowest kind replaced governance and the need to serve the people. Reason was replaced by acts of self-seeking, honesty by widening corruption and consistency in policymaking and implementation by an immediate expediency as the sole guiding factor. Initially there was resistance by civil servants, but that soon became muted and was replaced by a new level of comfort between minister and officer in which the officer became an active partner in wrongdoing and the minister overlooked the officer’s rapaciousness. Soon the nature of the civil service changed. It ceased to be the independent impartial body that implemented policy honestly and even-handedly and instead became a partner in populism, corruption and downright running down of every principle of good government. In the process the civil servants lost their own credibility and status and they are no longer admired by the people.

The malaise goes deeper still. Under the new dispensation the development programmes have all suffered because the disciplinary control of senior officers over their subordinates has eroded. Therefore, orders are not carried out, development funds are defalcated, projects are not completed in time and there are heavy cost over-runs, there is shoddy workmanship and our economy is hampered in achieving its full potential. Who suffers? The people, obviously.

One result of the politicians reducing the officers to nonentities is that officers at the decision making level have stopped taking decisions. Files are kept endlessly in play, worthless queries are raised, obscure factors brought in to facilitate further delay and tracks covered in order to avoid fixation.
of responsibility. The Ministers, too, do not give clear-cut guidelines and orders. A major factor in this is our completely skewed system of accountability. An officer who does nothing, takes no decisions, clears no projects never is in trouble. An officer who takes decisions and makes them work is bound to be in trouble because some mischievous complainant, some newspaper hound, some Central Bureau of Investigation Inspector will sit in judgement over the hapless officer and no one will come forward to defend him. The fact that nothing is done is never called to account, but an officer who actually achieves will spend the rest of his career answering questions and facing inquiries. We have to change our system of accountability whereby we judge by results, not by how beautiful the file looks, we praise achievement and punish those who just push files, reward those who deliver in time and come down heavily on procrastinators. No officer should be judged by an auditor or a policeman, but only by his peers and superiors. Of course those who stray from the path of honesty must be ruthlessly weeded out, but let us encourage decisiveness and scourge those who make an art of shirking responsibility.

In the field, especially in the districts, the level of petty, day to day bickering between officials and politicians has reached truly horrendous proportions. There are many reasons for this. Our bureaucracy has become insensitive and is increasingly cut off from the common citizen who, in turn, has the most bitter experience of delay, harassment and exploitation at the hands of officials. Even the simplest of legitimate work, such as obtaining a building permission, processing of a tax matter, getting copies of a paper one is entitled to, registering a First Information Report in a police station, has become so difficult that either the citizen has to resort to political support or he pays a bribe. Supervisory officers obviously do not inspect or monitor their subordinate officers, or ensure that citizens are not harassed. This only encourages political intervention and legitimately so. After a while such practices become the only remedy available to citizens and cumulatively lead to the development of political and bureaucratic malpractices.

The blame for this rests fairly and squarely on officialdom which has increasingly become inefficient, corrupt, rapacious and impervious to the needs of the people. That is why the general perception about the government servants is that they are negative, obstructionists, deaf and even positively hostile to the citizens. The situation is aggravated by the party workers of the ruling party expecting the officials to toe their line and actively support the party workers, while keeping the opposition workers at arms length. This strikes at the very roots of the principles of impartiality and political neutrality of civil servants. In the short run a politicized civil service may appeal to the politicians in power, but in a democracy parties are voted out of office and it is then that the virtues of an independent judiciary and impartial civil service begin to be appreciated. It is quite amazing that officers indicted by the Election Commission are often the darlings of the politicians. When the Congress was in power in M.P. three Collectors were found by the Election Commission to have done wholesale tampering with electoral rolls. Not only did nothing happen to them but they were all subsequently promoted. Now that the BJP is in power, a Collector who was photographed kneeling at the feet of the BJP candidate during an election meeting was rewarded by being made Collector of the capital of the State.

There are two other aspects of the politician-officer interface which bear mention. M.P. was the first State which claimed to have introduced Panchayat Raj as per the provisions of 73rd and 74th Amendments of the Constitution. However, because the ministers and legislators felt threatened by local government institutions they soon ensured that the system was sabotaged. Shri Digvijay Singh, the then Chief Minister, introduced a system of so-called district government which virtually neutralised both urban and rural local bodies by handing over power to the minister incharge of the district. On the one hand it weakened local government and on the other it brought municipal and panchayat officers,
apart from the district administration, in direct contact with a minister. This has resulted in a complete break down of relations between the elected wing of local government and the officials because the mayors and municipal presidents and heads of panchayats at all levels feel marginalised and vent their anger on the officials. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the government of India, under goading by Mani Shankar Iyer, the Panchayat Minister, has established direct links with districts and Gram Panchayats, bypassing both the State Government and the elected bodies at local levels. This is a complete negation of the principle of federalism. It is also administratively most unwise because it establishes an unequal relationship between a powerful Central Government and relatively weak local government, with virtually no role for the State Government which is constitutionally empowered to face the Federal Government.

The politics of defection has now been fine-tuned to the politics of coalition in which little splinter groups, regional parties with just a few seats in Parliament or the State Legislature, each demands its pound of flesh to support the government. When I joined the IAS forty-nine years ago we had political parties which had a ruling ideology, programmes and long term objectives. This, in turn, inspired civil servants to be partners in the process of nation building. Officers such as P.S. Bapna in M.P. pushed the Community Development model of participative development of S.K. Dey. D. Bandopadhyay in West Bengal was the officer who made possible the land reforms movement of Operation Barga of Hare Krishna Konar. S.N. Mehta in M.P. built up the M.P. Electricity Board as one of the most efficient power utilities in the country, after having built the Bhilai Steel Plant, just as P.N. Thapar and M.S. Randhawa built Bhakra Nangal and Chandigarh in the Punjab.

1967, the watershed year of politics in India, saw ideology, programmes and long term plans becoming terms of opprobrium in the political lexicon, to be replaced by jockeying for power, money politics, populism and immediate expediency becoming the new mantras. Obviously the civil services did not remain unaffected, with all the results already narrated in this paper. Unless we take urgent steps to correct these unfortunate developments one can only foresee a bleak administrative future.

One need not play the blame game because there is need to move on to something better. Obviously in a democracy the start has to be political. It is in this context that this paper attempts to suggest remedial measures. We need to make a strong political statement that in our scheme of things the power to lay down policy, legislate, monitor and oversee government, approve plans and budgets, create a blue print of development all lie within the political domain. Civil servants have to advise, draft practical plans and implement policy as prescribed by the political executive. In turn the politicians must not intervene in the day-to-day administration, except to the extent of calling officials to account for efficient and timely implementation. Certainly there can be no compromise on official impartiality and neutrality and this must be willingly recognized and accepted by the political partners.

In order that political parties may be reinforced in their decision to observe legislative and administrative propriety and consistency we also need back up political reforms. The tragedy of the post 1967 political scenario is that the cohesiveness and, therefore, the relatively principled policies of political parties were lost and instead splinter groups, regional outfits and vested interests have assumed a larger than life image and are able to dictate terms to major political parties who are keen to capture power. Both the NDA and UPA have repeatedly quoted the compulsions of coalition politics as an excuse for unprincipled governance or even non-governance. Examples are not wanting of the most corrupt elements in politics obtaining advantages under threat of withdrawing support from government. The following electoral reforms, therefore, are suggested so that either these small parties disappear or they merge into larger parties, leading to a polarization in which there is a centrist party, a left of centre party and a right of centre party. Coalition would then be between these parties with, perhaps, the
centrist party holding the balance, extremes in politics would be softened, the need to pander to the minuscule interest groups would cease and policies and programmes could then be more principled and consistent. It is suggested that either through an amendment in the Constitution or in The Representation of the People Act, 1951 the following provisions be made:

1. No independent should be qualified to contest a State Legislature election until he has successfully contested at least one election to a local body, rural or urban.

2. No independent should be qualified to contest an election to Parliament unless he has successfully contested a State Legislature election. He would thus have to hold in succession at least one local government and one State level elected position before standing for Parliament. This would eliminate the large army of self-seeking independents now plaguing the scene.

3. No political party should be qualified to put up candidates for election to Parliament unless it has won at least five seats each in the Legislative Assemblies of at least three States. This would automatically force regional parties to expand their area of operation or to merge into larger parties.

4. On the ballot there should a column which reads “none of these“. If this column gets the highest number of votes the election to that constituency should stand automatically countermanded. All the candidates would stand disqualified for the next six years and the political parties who have put up candidates unacceptable to the electorate would have to meet the cost pro rata of holding a fresh poll to that constituency. This will perhaps help in encouraging parties not to put up criminals, anti-social elements, out-right casteists, racists and communalists as candidates because the people would not accept them.

We need to look at the manner in which we are training our civil servants, especially the All India Services. My remarks are addressed to the IAS but they apply mutatis mutandis to the IPS and Indian Forest Service also. At present an IAS officer does a year’s course at the Academy and is sent into the field for one year. He returns for what is known as the sandwich course, after which his training is altogether sporadic. I would like to see the system to be replaced by one in which the officer spends a year at the Academy undergoing a really tough and vigorous induction course. Thereafter he should be sent into the field where for one year in the district he will be given practical training before taking charge of a sub-division. In the fifth year he should return to the Academy for six months, during which he would share his experiences with his colleagues and the directing staff, would have access to a multitude of case studies which enable him to know whether his approach to a particular problem was correct or not, and he should also be given more specialized training which would fit him to take charge of a district.

After this course the officer should go back for district posting. At the end of another five years, that is, in the tenth year of service, the officer should be pulled back for training for another six months in the Academy, the Academy of a sister Service, an Administrative Staff College to be set up similar to the Defence Service Staff College, or any other institution which can impart specialized training to the officer.

The next five years should be spent by the officer in learning how to take decisions, fine-honing skills in which he has an aptitude and generally moving him towards the midway mark in his career. In the 15th year of service the officer must again have a six months to one-year training course in an institution which will specialize him in those areas of administration for which he has shown an aptitude. This would be a rigorously academic course because here we are now trying to develop fully the latent possibilities of the officer and prepare him for senior postings.
The next five years would see an even greater specialization by the officer. In the twentieth year he should be sent on two years sabbatical. By now it should be clear in what areas of his work an officer can show the greatest promise. The sabbatical can be spent at a selected university or institution abroad, for which government would pay the full cost, or it could be spent in such an institution in India, with government paying the officer, by way of incentive to stay within India, the difference between the cost of training abroad and in India. During these two years the officer would be required to follow a chosen discipline of research and higher studies which would enable him to produce a thesis which would earn him a Ph.D. degree. The thesis would be examined by a really high-powered board of examiners, who would determine whether or not the officer is fit to be awarded a doctorate. If found unfit the officer will stand compulsorily retired. This would weed out all the elements in the service who do not possess the qualities required of civil servants at the senior, decision making levels.

We have to build into the system a structured, interlocking accountability in which at every level of the civil service from the level of patwari, police constable, forest guard, clerk, etc., right to the top there is an assignment of duties and responsibilities. The government servant would then be held accountable for the manner in which he has performed his duty. Any failure on his part will be visited upon the head of his immediate superior, whose job is to supervise, inspect, guide, correct and discipline his immediate subordinate. This should go all the way up the line so that the interlocking accountability forces every level of government servants to function efficiently. There has to be a built-in system of rewards and punishments, with criteria being laid down which can eliminate arbitrariness and subjectivity in granting rewards or awarding punishments. As stated elsewhere in this paper, at present there is no incentive to work hard and efficiently and no adverse consequences for shirking work, indulging in corruption or otherwise failing to achieve an acceptable level of efficiency.

There has to be a Performance Evaluation Board or system whereby the performance of government servant is monitored and evaluated from time to time in an objective manner. Interlocking accountability would be a part of this monitoring system because if superior officers regularly inspect their subordinates and give them suitable directions performance will improve all-round. At present not only is there no performance audit but even the old system of awareness of an officer’s strengths, weaknesses and reputation seems to have become a thing of the past. Formerly, at least pre 1967, an officer’s reputation became established even in the first five years of service and it was taken into account when deciding his posting. Let me give an example from my own experience. Pt. D.P. Mishra was our Chief Minister and one could not hope for a more decisive and competent politician to head the State. On a visit to Ujjain in 1966, where I was D.C., the Chief Minister asked me to accompany him in his car up to Indore. He told me that he was very pleased with my work and that I could be trusted to handle the most difficult task. Before I could recover from my euphoria he poured cold water on me by stating that there are two districts he would never give him, Indore and Jabalpur. I asked him whether he thought me unfit to handle these two districts and his reply was a classic. He said, “You can handle these districts with both hands tied behind your back. However, I have interests there which you can not serve”. The venerable old Chief Minister knew me inside out and where he had political or other interests he would never send me, both because I would not serve these interests and because, as a good Chief Minister, he did not want to embarrass me. Nowadays we do not even know the capabilities of our officers and, therefore, they are shunted around because local vested interests so desire.

This brings me to the second last point I want to make in this paper. We have to work out a system by which government servants are shielded from arbitrariness and the whimsicality of individual ministers, legislators, politicians and local vested interests. The Chief Minister and the Ministers do not gain any stature because they demonstrate that it is within their power to transfer an officer. No one questions
this. However, if officers are transferred every few months how can we have any specialization on their part, how can we expect them to deliver governance to the people, how can we expect them to implement policies, projects and plans because they will be shifted even before they fully understand the problems of the area in which they are posted? Personnel management, therefore, has to become a strong pillar of administration. This means that the capabilities, professional competence, integrity and reputation of every government servant must be charted and brought on record. Thereafter postings should be done in accordance with the task in hand, the problems of a job and the suitability of the official for that work. He should be given a reasonable tenure, say three years, in that post. He should only be shifted if there is sufficient reason, to be recorded in writing and capable of being defended during independent enquiry, if the officer is manifestly unsuitable for the job. Otherwise postings must be determined by the rules or standing instructions which are issued and which are open for inspection by all. The joke in U.P. is that no D.M. or S.P. survives long enough in a district for his annual confidential report to be written because his tenure is less than three months. Such a system cannot prevail. I state this with great deliberation because ultimately a secure service which is spared arbitrary transfers will be more efficient and the advantage of good governance will naturally go to the political parties. The fact that people will also thereby benefit is paramount, but unfortunately the welfare of the people is not even of secondary importance to our politicians and their bureaucratic allies.

This brings me to the last point. Training, motivation and monitoring of civil servants is a must. But so should it for our politicians also. The vast majority of them are conscientious people who also realize that an electoral advantage can be reaped if they provide good government to the people and for this the civil servant is their instrument. They must be oriented to realize how important this institution is and how injurious it is to misuse this instrument. They must also be trained to understand the constitutional and legal relationships between them and the civil servants so that the areas of misunderstanding and conflict shrink and become almost nonexistent. This training, this orientation, this change of mind-set must come about as result of consistent training, interaction, workshops, seminars and even lectures by senior politicians and civil servants who present a more balanced perspective before the politicians. In other countries the equation between the political masters and the permanent public servant has been worked out quite satisfactorily. I think such a thing is possible in India also. After all, the best results have always come when we have a combination of Jawaharlal Nehru and Dharam Vira, Sardar Patel and V.P. Menon, Govind Vallab Pant and A.N. Jha, Morarji Desai and D.S. Bakhle and Prakash Chand Sethi and R.C.V.P. Norohna. The first name in each pair is a politician and the second name is a civil servant. Do we need more evidence to prove my point?

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